[DeTomaso] NPC

[MikeLDrew at aol.com]

In a message dated 6/21/13 23 34 9, adin at frontier.net writes:


> Didn't someone write a book about the Wyer LeMans efforts? Racing In The 
> Rain or something?  Always thought that could make a fascinating story- 
> wonder if the book did the subject justice?
> 

>>>It's a *fantastic* book.   By sheer coincidence, Pantera owner Peter 
Havlik from Canada e-mailed me an excerpt just two days ago:


‘Racing in the Rain: My Years With Brilliant Drivers, Legendary Sports Cars 
and a Dedicated Team’
By JOHN HORSMAN
Published: May 31, 2013

Chapter 3. Ford Advanced Vehicles (1964-1966) 

In 1964 engineer John Horsman joined Ford Advanced Vehicles, a partnership 
between the Ford Motor Company and Lola, the British sports-car constructor 
led by designer Eric Broadley. Its aim was to develop the Ford GT40 into an 
endurance racer that could compete successfully against Ferrari at Le Mans 
and other events. Horsman was hired by his former boss John Wyer, the 
longtime Aston-Martin racing team manager who led the marque to victory at the 24 
Hours of Le Mans in 1959. 


The entry of Ford Motor Company into European motor racing has been well 
documented, and the failure (as it was viewed by many) of the newly created 
Ford GT40 at the 1964 Le Mans 24 Hours is also well known. It was certainly 
considered a failure within Ford and by many in the press, but did anyone in 
the racing business really expect them to win first time out? Just to have 
finished the 24 Hours would have been a major achievement, but the cars had 
shown that they were very fast, with Phil Hill setting the quickest lap of the 
race. Phil had been second on the grid in the GT40’s first race at the 
Nürburgring, bested only by John Surtees in his Ferrari 275 P. The Fords had 
also shown they would be a serious threat in the future, given a sensible test 
and development program. 


Ford had started the bidding for entry into international road racing by 
trying to buy Ferrari, and discussions were well advanced before they finally 
broke down (which was just as well for the future of motor racing), so they 
decided to go it alone. The Lola Mk 6 GT, designed and built by Eric 
Broadley, had attracted Ford’s attention when it competed in the 1963 Le Mans 24 
Hours, driven by David Hobbs and Richard Attwood. After considering other 
options, Ford offered Broadley a partnership to jointly produce a car to 
challenge the domination of Ferrari in FIA World Sports Car Racing. 


Unfortunately there was no clear definition of responsibilities from the 
outset, resulting in order and counter-order between Broadley and Ford 
engineer Roy Lunn. When I arrived at the Yeovil Road workshop, neither of these two 
great designers was speaking to the other, instead communicating through 
middleman Wyer. How three prototype cars got built at all in those working 
conditions is amazing. Wyer was nominally in charge of the operation, but even 
that changed from one Ford management meeting to the next, depending on 
internal politics. At the time of my arrival the operation was still being run 
under the Lola name and bank account, but Ford Advanced Vehicles (FAV), with 
Walter Hayes and Sir Leonard Crossland, from Ford of Britain, and Wyer as 
the directors, was finally formed on July 1, 1964, just 4 days before the 
Reims 12 Hours. 


On arrival I was not exactly clear what my duties were to be, so I just 
assisted and encouraged where I could be the most use — but that was to change 
shortly. Everyone was exhausted from the long hours that had been the norm 
during the preceding months, and spirits were low. We believed that the entry 
of three cars for the 12-hour race so soon after Le Mans was a great 
mistake by the Ford hierarchy in Detroit. The press had been reasonably 
sympathetic regarding the Ford effort at Le Mans, and a period of retrenchment and 
serious development should have followed. Instead, there was what seemed to us 
to be a ridiculous desire to receive another bloody nose in the Ford–Ferrari 
war. Nothing in the way of increased reliability could be built into the 
cars during the 10 days between the two long-distance races. 


At Le Mans two cars had been eliminated by Colotti transmission failures. 
Despite all the facilities available in Detroit, Ford had not analyzed the 
Colotti transaxle, and it was used only because Eric Broadley had run it in 
the Lola Mk 6 prototype in 1963. Even then, it caused the car’s retirement. No 
attempt had been made by Ford engineering to improve it. 
I was at Reims when the rear doors of the race car transporter were opened, 
revealing the driveshaft of one car already broken and hanging down after 
its journey from Slough inside the transporter — incredible! What a way to 
start the weekend. The engine used so far for the GT40 had been the 
all-aluminum version of the pushrod 4.2-liter Fairlane engine, as raced at 
Indianapolis. Due to shortages of this engine, one newly built car, GT40/105, was 
powered by a 4.7-liter, all-cast-iron Cobra engine, for which there were great 
hopes in the 12 Hours. The Richie Ginther/Masten Gregory car, GT40/103, which 
had taken second place in qualifying (behind the privately entered 
Surtees/Bandini Ferrari) was the first Ford to retire with failure of the Colotti 
gearbox. Next was the Attwood/Schlesser Cobra engine car, with another gearbox 
failure. I was somewhat of a spectator at this race, because all the other 
team members took up the positions they had played at Le Mans, of which Reims 
seemed to be just a continuation. When this second GT40 stopped on the 
track somewhere past the pits, I persuaded one of the mechanics from that car to 
join me in trying to reach it in case there was anything we could do to 
make it run again. So we walked up alongside the track just as dawn was 
breaking, the race having started at midnight. We were about half a mile from the 
pits when our remaining car, GT40/102, driven by Bruce McLaren and Phil Hill, 
passed us. At that very instant the Fairlane Indy engine exploded most 
dramatically with a huge bang and clouds of sparks and smoke. That was the end 
of Reims for us. We never did find the car with the failed gearbox until it 
was retrieved after the race. 



After Reims there was a gradual withdrawal of the American engineers back 
to Dearborn, except for Len Bailey, who had worked tirelessly on the GT40 
design and avoided the Ford politics. Bailey was an Englishman who had gone to 
the United States to work for Ford, now returning to the UK temporarily on 
the racing project. But Len’s greatest contribution was yet to come, and in 
the end he never returned to the U.S. Also at this time Eric Broadley decided 
he had had enough of Ford politics and split from FAV, taking his Lola men 
with him, of course, but also taking valuable ex-Aston craftsmen Laurie 
Bray, Terry Hadley, and Don Beresford, who had all elected to work for Eric. 
Until this split my own position and duties had been unclear, but now I 
became the engineer in charge of development, preparation, and racing at 
Slough. Presumably Wyer had foreseen that Broadley was about to depart and had 
held me in reserve until now. At FAV we were left in limbo while Dearborn 
hesitated on the proposed production of the GT40s. Within hours the “100-car” 
program was canceled and then reinstated. Finally Wyer was given the go-ahead, 
and suddenly we were very busy again. The greatest weakness of the car was 
obviously the Colotti gearbox. Veteran racing mechanic Alf Francis was 
associated with Colotti at that time, but even he could not improve its 
durability. When Wyer was managing director of Aston Martin, he had had excellent 
relations with Zahnradfabrik Friedrichshafen AG regarding a transmission for 
the DB5. Now he visited ZF twice during 1964 to check on the availability of a 
suitable transmission for the GT40. Wyer immediately ordered prototype 
versions of the ZF 5DS25 five-speed transaxle for endurance testing by FAV, even 
though delivery was 7 to 8 months away. 


As orders for the major components of the 100-car build were placed with 
our various suppliers, it was obvious that more testing was required to 
uncover weak points before parts were delivered to Slough. One of the areas giving 
trouble was the ventilation of the engine oiling system. Under 
high-cornering loads, oil was spraying out of the breathers. Ugly metal boxes were 
welded to the rocker covers as catch tanks. These delayed the onset of oil 
escaping but did not entirely cure this annoying problem. While testing at 
Silverstone one day Wyer suggested that I should accompany Richard Attwood in the 
passenger seat as he drove a GT40 around the track at racing speeds to 
observe the engine through the small glass rear window. I had to kneel on the 
passenger seat and hold on while Richard hurled the car through the corners. The 
oil loss problem did not occur at anything less than maximum cornering 
effort so Richard had to press on hard. I hung on, desperately trying not to 
fall on top of him; not being able to see ahead to anticipate the corners made 
it worse. The noise was shattering, and the g-forces were greater than any I 
had experienced before. In the end I saw nothing amiss in the engine bay 
and was glad when the ride was over. 


Excerpted from “Racing in the Rain: My Years With Brilliant Drivers, 
Legendary Sports Cars and a Dedicated Team” by John Horsman. Published by David 
Bull Publishing. Copyright 2006.